

Government domination in policy making in the House of Representatives during the President Jokowi era

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Abstract

The rigid cycle of public policy making was ignored when the oligarchic group from the party elites controlled the agenda-setting process, which became the basis for policy making in Indonesia. This study explains how the political tradition of building consensus among political party elites and the government needs to pay more attention to the formal legislative process in the House of Representatives (DPR). The agreed consensus forms the basis for the chairperson of the commission group to control members of their party in the commission and legislative bodies to support the consensus agreed upon by their party's political leadership. This study discovered that restrictions imposed by strengthening the hierarchical leadership and elite command of political parties affected the power of the DPR. During almost two decades of Jokowi's administration, the shift in the power of the DPR has continued to occur so that it has a decreased effect in policy making to modify, replace and reject government proposals.

Keywords

commission groups, elite, legislature, politics, public policy

Introduction

The domination of executive over legislature in making public policy has re-emerged where the rigid cycle of public policy making is ignored when oligarchic groups control the government running in a democratic system. This oligarchic group seeks to influence the legislature in the

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policy-making process to support what has been decided in the government to be accepted as a common policy (Asrinaldi et al., 2022). Though acting in a democratic system, the essence of this oligarchic power is to guarantee their mastery of political and economic rights in the name of the state's interests (Cameron, 2021). This reality contradicts the principle of representative democracy, which prioritises a balance between the two state institutions, namely the executive body and the legislature responsible for making public policies (Mezey, 2008). Even by taking advantage of the weak state conditions, the executive body controlled by the oligarchs makes policies without involving the legislature. For example, the Covid-19 pandemic caused governments in many countries to dominate decision making (Bolleyer and Salát, 2021; Griglio, 2020; Maor and Howlett, 2020).

Although many scholars agree that the oligarchy formed within Jokowi's administration has contributed to the decline of democracy in Indonesia (Fossati, 2024; Power and Warburton, 2020), this article highlights the policy-making process in the House of Representatives (DPR) through traditions that have developed in the DPR post-New Order era about consensus among political party elites and the government (Ziegenhain, 2021). Few scholars have explored the notion that the decline of democracy in Indonesia stems from the political tradition of influencing consensus within the DPR. This practice among political party elites has had a detrimental impact on the DPR's function. Despite efforts to reform the DPR under international aid bodies, Indonesia's declining quality of legislation has further contributed to its democratic regression (Hermanto et al., 2024).

This article reveals that the political tradition of building consensus can be traced back to two processes commonly practised by political party elites. The first is political lobbying at the elite level, both within and outside the DPR with government-supporting parties. This process further solidifies the position of oligarchic groups within Indonesia's political system. Second, following the agreements between these elites, they introduce these agreements to their members in the DPR by directly controlling their members in the DPR's factions, commissions and legislative bodies. This strategy aligns with the rules governing the legislative process in the DPR as stipulated in Article 113, Paragraph 3 of DPR Regulation Number 1 of 2020, which members, commission, joint commission or legislative bodies carry out.

The members of the DPR were controlled through the political parties they lead utilising the Commission Group (*Kelompok Komisi/Poksi*) in every commission in the DPR. The commission is a tool for the DPR in partnership with the government, especially with President Jokowi's cabinet ministers. Party elites who became oligarchs in the government directed their members through the Chair of the Commission Group (*Kapoksi*) to agree on the Jokowi government's policies. Even in the policy-making process in the DPR, no heated debate has occurred to reject the policies proposed by the government to the DPR.

This research utilised the concept of Baldwin (2004), which divides the types of legislative institutions into four types—(a) policy-making legislature; (b) policy-influencing legislation; (c) legislation with minimal or marginal policy effect; and (d) legislature with no real policy effect—to analyse the issues in the DPR in the policy-making process. The following section elaborates on the analytical framework, the development of the legislature and its relationship with the government in policy making during each period of the president's leadership in Indonesia. Furthermore, it also explains the reasons why the DPR during Jokowi's time only had a minimum effect on the policy-making process. The final section presents the implications of the minimal role of the DPR in the policy-making process during Jokowi's time for the decline of democracy in Indonesia.

Framework for analysis: Legislature with a minimal or marginal policy effect

A good democratic system is reflected in the balanced role of power between the executive and legislative branches. These two state institutions carry out their respective functions under the laws regulating them. Compliance with laws and regulations is what makes a government stable. If one of the branches of state power, whether the executive or legislative body, is dominant, then the democratic system will be disrupted. Moreover, if the regime in power finds it challenging to evaluate policies or in the case where accountability is low, political checks and balances are needed (Gratton and Morelli, 2022). Likewise, democracy will also be disrupted if a coalition of political parties forms a government involving all political parties in parliament, leaving only small parties unable to oversee the running of the government in power.

One of the weaknesses of multi-party systems in countries that practise presidential systems is the formation of a non-solid government system (Mainwaring, 1993). Building a coalition of dominant political parties becomes a strategic choice for political parties in parliament to strengthen the government, regardless of whether or not the political party is an opponent in the election. There is no ideological partition for each political party from the coalition formed. For political parties, coalitions can occur as long as their respective interests are fulfilled. Therefore, it is not surprising that political parties are straightforward in entering and leaving the government depending on the short-term interests they want to realise. Even in a presidential system like Indonesia, political parties that originally formed a coalition with the government can easily leave the government without being able to overthrow the existing government.

However, the coalition formed among political parties in establishing the same government indirectly affects how the legislative institution operates by the desires of the supported government. It is evident that external factors, namely the government supported by the coalition parties, influence the internal factors, namely the change in behaviour of legislative members influenced by their party elites who support the government. For example, executing the DPR's functions in Indonesia in policy making depends on the consensus between political party elites and the government in influencing the DPR's work. This reality presents a paradox when linked to legislative institutional theory, which explains that the structure of the legislature and the rules governing coalition formation will affect how consensus is reached and how the coalition operates within the legislative institution (see Shepsle, 2010).

The implications of these external and internal factors impact the legislature's ability to influence the policies proposed by the executive body. This condition also affects the legislature's position in making government policies: active in the legislature, reactive in the legislature, marginal in the legislature and stamping the legislature (Baldwin, 2004). The last two terms require attention, especially in countries that have just instituted democracy or are stuck with an authoritarian model of government. This phenomenon can be found in authoritarian countries such as China and North Korea. The legislatures in these two countries have no real policy effect and tend to be the stampers of decisions made by the executive.

The legislature's role in making government policies is only sometimes balanced. Most of the time, legislatures with minimal or marginal policy effects cannot amend or reject measures proposed by the executive. In addition, the legislature is even incapable of producing and replacing its policies. Baldwin (2004: 299–302) concluded that several internal factors can cause that condition, namely the balance of parties in parliament, the majority size, the perception among MPs of the prime minister's authority and popularity, the prime minister's skills in managing parliament,

the parliamentary business management skills and abilities, the prevalence of divisive issues, the quality of the institutional structure through which parliament can check on the executive, the unity and quality of the opposition, as well as national and international events.

Arter (2006) has a more specific view involving two important variables to observe the strengths and weaknesses of the legislature in carrying out its functions. The first is the extent to which the legislature is efficient in making the right decisions. Since this legislative body is an entity that involves many political parties in it, the intended efficiency is related to the collectivity of action in the process of making appropriate policies. Debate and lobbying carried out by political parties in making policies must take place efficiently to regulate collective action. The second variable is the extent to which the legislature is autonomous in examining and politically balancing power. A strong legislative body position will make it autonomous so that this body becomes independent in making decisions free from the influence of the executive body.

Even so, every country is unique in making public policy in the legislature. Differences in political systems, ideologies and problems also influence how the legislature works in policy making. Olson and Mezey (1991: 6) explained that:

the stage of economic development that a nation has reached, its prevailing political ideology, its constitutional and political history and the nature of the policy challenges that it confronts are contextual variables that, when combined, will create a somewhat unique environment within which each of the world's legislative bodies operates.

They also concluded three categories that influence the policy-making process in the legislature. The first relates to the nature of political institutions and actors outside the legislature. Their role in the policy-making process and their relationship with the legislature is important to note. These institutions and actors include the executive elite, political parties, constituents and interest groups. The second category is related to the internal structure of the legislature, the presence of parties in that institution and its committee system. Third, the character of the policies faced by policymakers in the legislature will vary across policy fields and policy stages, as well as across countries.

The legislature in post-New Order Indonesia

The practice of political elites building consensus in post-New Order Indonesia has undermined reform agendas to move the country away from autocratic systems. However, the strong consensus among oligarchic elites has led to a tendency for stable governance. On the other hand, this stability has resulted in the internal decay of democracy, as reform agendas are not implemented by the few elites in power (Mietzner and Aspinall, 2010). The political tradition of building consensus among oligarchic elites has negatively impacted the quality of legislative institutions, which tend to produce policies that benefit political power. Furthermore, government elites and their cronies engage in illegal resource management practices through policies that justify their actions (see Aspinall and Mietzner, 2019).

The consensus built among oligarchic elites begins with power negotiations between them within the government and in the parliament. Regardless, the president who wins the election always seeks majority support from political parties in the DPR. The goal is to facilitate the implementation of their work programmes promised to the public during the campaign. This

reality is indeed intriguing. Although Indonesia does not have a parliamentary system, the multi-party system opens up opportunities for coalitions to support the elected president in forming the government.

Beginning with Law No. 7 of 2017 concerning elections, which requires a coalition of political parties to nominate presidential and vice-presidential candidates, this law is a consequence of the few parties winning enough seats in the DPR to meet the 20% seat threshold. Upon winning the election, the elected president and vice president also communicate with political party elites outside their electoral coalition to gain support for forming the government, often by offering ministerial positions to the party leaders. This political tradition has continued over time, especially since the introduction of direct presidential elections in 2004.

During the reform era, there was a change in policy making in the DPR. The ups and downs of the relationship between the executive and legislature in making public policies affected the quality of the policies. At the start of the reform, the DPR became a powerful body controlling the government. The resignation of President Soeharto from the power he held for 32 years by the student movement in May 1998 became a lesson for political party elites in the following period. Executive power must be controlled so that it is not abused. It is evident that the DPR's robust oversight of Abdurrahman Wahid, who became the first president during the reform era, ended with his impeachment as president on 23 July 2001. Starting from the Bulogate and Bruneigate scandals, the DPR suspected that Abdurrahman Wahid was rewarded with the issuance of a decree by President Abdurrahman Wahid. The issuance of this decree is a form of Abdurrahman Wahid's courage in confronting the legislature and political parties (Aspinall, 2010: 124–125) to dissolve the DPR as it was considered a disturbance to the government's stability. The issuance of this decree contradicted the 1945 Constitution and was a serious violation committed by President Abdurrahman Wahid, resulting in his dismissal from office (Barton, 2002; Crouch, 2010).

The policy-making process in the legislature during the reign of President Megawati, who succeeded President Abdurrahman Wahid, did not change. The DPR remained dominant in overseeing government administration. The DPR's strong position effectively influenced the executive in public policy making. Even so, the DPR can still cooperate with President Megawati in its functions. Moreover, President Megawati chose not to have a confrontation with the DPR, as happened during the time of President Abdurrahman Wahid.

The position of the DPR in policy making in the first term of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004–2009) was no different from the previous president. Members of the DPR have gained control over the policy-making process in the legislature. Even the policy of increasing the price of oil made by President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono at the beginning of his reign was firmly rejected by the DPR. This government policy has the support of its coalition parties in the DPR, namely the PPP coalition, the Democratic Party, PKS and PAN members of the populist coalition. However, parties outside the opposition government, namely the PDI-P, Golkar, the Prosperous Peace Party (PDS) and the Reform Star Party (PBR), which are members of the national coalition, strongly opposed this increase in oil prices. The feud between the two coalitions in political parties in the DPR in occupying strategic positions in DPR equipment such as legislative leaders, e.g. those in agencies and commissions, also affected the performance of the legislative body in the policy-making process (Ziegenhain, 2009: 38–40).

The moderate character of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's leadership in exercising government power was sufficient to aid his policies in the DPR. Moreover, his strategy of increasing cooperation with political parties in the DPR as a coalition made it easier for him to realise the policy agenda. President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono even let his coalition partners in the DPR

criticise his policies in the hope that there would be a middle ground involving his coalition parties. It was common for President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono to cancel, delay or modify policy reforms so that he was not hostile to political parties in the DPR (Aspinall et al., 2015: 3). Such an attitude confirmed that the DPR was very influential in the policy-making process during his administration.

The strong position of the DPR after the New Order regime illustrates the existence of a pluralism of power that is no longer held by the executive body. This power pluralism is followed by the emergence of a coalition pattern among political parties, which has implications for the relationship pattern between the executive and legislative bodies, especially that of the two in public policy making. The executive body was no longer the determinant of the direction of the DPR's policies, as these two bodies' powers began to balance when Indonesia entered a democratic transition. However, the political parties' coalition in the DPR in proposing presidential candidates for the general election changed the relationship between the two bodies of power in the past decade. Political parties tried to gain power not only in the executive body but also in the executive body for the sake of the economic and political power of the elites (Slater, 2018).

Policy making in the DPR during President Jokowi's period

President Jokowi's skill in building political consensus with opposing political elites has significantly bolstered his position as president. For instance, at the beginning of his administration in 2014, the political support he garnered in the DPR came only from the parties that backed him during the election: PDI-P, PKB, Nasdem and Hanura, totalling 208 seats. However, two years later, Jokowi persuaded Golkar, PPP and PAN to join his government. Including these three new parties strengthened Jokowi's political position in the DPR as the number of supporting seats increased to 380 out of 560, thus making his coalition a majority (Fionna and Hutchinson, 2019). This soft approach to building political consensus through expanding the coalition also impacted the legislation passed in Parliament. One notable example is the amendment of Law No. 17 of 2014 concerning the MPR, DPR and Regional Representatives Council (DPD) (MD3), which initially hindered PDI-P, the winner of the 2014 election, from securing leadership positions in the DPR.

As is well known, PDI-P was the leading party supporting President Jokowi as a presidential candidate in the 2014 election. The political coalition under the control of Gerindra and Golkar, which opposed the PDI-P coalition during the election, was a significant force in the DPR and consistently won votes in the DPR's decision-making process. As a result, despite being the winning party in the 2014 election, PDI-P still needed to secure one of the leadership positions in the DPR. However, with Golkar, PPP and PAN joining Jokowi's government, Law No. 17 of 2014 could be amended to become Law No. 2 of 2018. This revision positioned PDI-P in one of the leadership roles in the DPR (Prasetia, 2018). This political phenomenon also demonstrates that President Jokowi's strategy of building consensus through political coalitions by offering strategic positions to political party elites has benefited his position in policy making in the DPR.

Not only that, but President Jokowi also employed brutal tactics to pressure opposition parties into building a consensus with him. For instance, he intervened in internal conflicts within political parties and subsequently offered political consensus to resolve these internal issues (see Mietzner, 2016). By doing so, political parties recognized by the government would gain the right to participate in elections and other political activities. This strategy of forcibly building consensus also benefited Jokowi's administration in formulating policies and discussing them with the DPR.

The serious consequences of cooperation through this coalition can be seen in government administration and how they secure government policies they made in the DPR. The policy-making process in the DPR is 'controlled' by the ruling government and always supported by the DPR's decisions. Since the votes of the ruling coalition parties are dominant in the DPR, the emergence of opposition groups in the government is small. Since the Gerindra party left the Indonesia Fair and Prosperous coalition, which Gerindra formed ahead of the general election, he crossed over to the Indonesia Maju coalition that formed the government. The joining of Gerindra to Joko Widodo's government, which won the presidential election in 2019, added to the power of the coalition party's vote in the DPR to 427 seats or 74.6% (Sanur, 2019).

Policy making in the DPR is a political process involving the executive. These two institutions mutually balance their respective functions to produce policies that are democratic and follow the public interest. This process begins with agenda setting and the process of policy formulation. However, the implementation of each institution's function is not always balanced. Domination between the two could occur during the Jokowi administration. A government coalition involving the heads of political parties in Jokowi's cabinet could control the critical attitude of DPR members towards government policies. Control over the attitude of DPR members is carried out by intervening through orders and directives from the party elite concerned through the extension of the faction. Moreover, factions have a special mechanism for controlling their members in the legislature (Darwis, 2022).

Usually, to control members of the commission in the DPR, factions also form faction groups. This faction group is led by a chairperson who is an extension of the faction leader in the DPR. Communication between the chair of the fraction group (Kapoksi) and the faction group leaders from other parties is very intensive, with the head of the faction managing its members in the commission so that they can oversee the political party policy agenda in the commission. Even further, this Kapoksi also regulates what can and cannot be discussed and criticised by members of political parties in the commission. Moreover, the problem discussed in the DPR is a joint agenda agreed upon by the coalition parties supporting Jokowi's government in the cabinet. The Kapoksi's strong intervention against members of political parties in the commissions caused the DPR's position to become marginal in the law-making process. Apart from controlling its members in the internal commission, the Kapoksi also maintained communication with the Kapoksi of other political parties to agree on their policy agenda in the commission. Interestingly, although there are political parties outside the government coalition among these commissions, including the PKS and the Democratic Party, they do not interfere with the agenda to oversee the policies of parties supporting the government. Moreover, through genuine communication between the Kapoksi outside the government party and the Kapoksi of the party supporting the government, their opposition attitude became soft. However, the opposition party still pays serious attention to the policy agenda proposed by the government-supporting political parties in the parliament (Rosiade, 2022).

The policy agenda made through the Kapoksis' agreement in the commission is conveyed to all members of their respective factions. The goal is to direct what they should do when there is discussion in the agenda setting. However, the preparation of this policy agenda is a serious political process since it involves debate and discussion about what policies should be decided to become a joint agenda between the government and the DPR in policy making (see Howlett et al., 2020). Moreover, the policies have drawn up many problems faced by the community, which concern these two institutions.

Communication that occurs is not only in the commission. Even in forming the Working Committee and Special Committee, which also complements the DPR, the Kapoksi is very

active in lobbying politicians to realise the party's political agenda in this legislative body. The Kapoksi is one of the institutions in the DPR that designs the party's policy agenda at the commission level. Usually, the Kapoksi receives orders from the faction leaders to convey a certain agenda from the leadership of political parties to formulate several party policies in the commission. The agenda-setting process begins with the communication carried out by each head of staff supporting the government. This mechanism impacts the freedom of political party members to be actively involved in criticising government policies. The relationship between the DPR's apparatus in controlling the policy-making process in the DPR can be seen in Figure 1.

In many ways, the dominance of coalition members of political parties in the DPR has an impact on the power in making policy in the DPR, which is straightforward (moderate). Norton (1990: 4–5) described the character of this 'moderate' parliamentary power, which tends to change the policies proposed by the executive but not resist them. It is conceivable that all the party factions supporting the government in the commission are not autonomous in setting the agenda. The shift in power in the policy-making process moves towards the lack of a legislative body in the policy-making process to modify, replace and reject the proposals of the executive body (Arter, 2006: 248–249; Baldwin, 2004: 296). The effect of the coalition of political parties in the DPR can influence the process of making public policies, the shifting process of which can be seen in Figure 2.

The minimum policy effect of the legislature in Indonesia is reflected in the non-autonomy of political party members in each of the DPR's instruments carrying out their functions. The existence of complementary organs in the legislature is an essential variable in assessing the power of the DPR in the policy-making process with the executive body (Olson and Mezey, 1991). Moreover, the whereabouts of members of these political parties are directly monitored by the Head of the Faction and Kapoksi who will control them. The formulation of the policy agenda is communicated by political party elites who are in government, such as party leaders, to other




Figure 1. The process of command, communication and lobbying in policy making in the DPR.




Figure 2. The relationship between party coalitions and the power of the DPR in policy making.

leaders, including faction heads. In meetings, they informally discuss government agendas that will be brought to the DPR session. The roles of the head of the faction greatly determine how the agenda setting is prepared for the first time. The crucial issues that will become the agenda setting concern decisions brought up at the plenary session level, communication and political lobbying, which will be intensively carried out by the head of the faction. Usually, a decision at the plenary level ends with an agreement among the parties supporting the government to form a special committee or working committee that will study the issues that become agenda setting. On the other hand, if the issues that become agenda setting will only be discussed at the commission level, the faction head will communicate this with the Kapoksi, who is in charge of discussing the agenda setting.

Indeed, in the process of agenda setting, this policy requires discussion and debate among political parties. However, in reality, these discussions and debates are carried out only to show that the functions of the DPR are carried out ideally as mechanisms in a democratic system. However, the discussion and debate process often ends with only providing notes on the recommendations sent to the government. Rarely has the DPR been able to reject such bills as the people they represent want them to. The desire of the DPD to propose a Bill on Village Owned Enterprises (BUMDesa) to the DPR is an example. However, the government suggestion not to continue deliberating on the bill as this provision had been regulated in Law Number 6 of 2014 concerning villages and its derivatives and Law Number 11 of 2020 concerning job creation was approved by the DPR. The DPR also complemented the government's proposal through the recommendations it gave to the DPD and the government regarding the results of the joint discussion.

Following the policy cycle usually carried out in a democratic country, there is also a policy formulation process that raises debates in parliament in addition to agenda setting. Policy formulation is a response by policy actors to public problems (Birkland, 2020; Gerston, 2010). How actors develop policy alternatives per the agreed agenda setting depends on the interests they carry. It

is not uncommon for the political agenda of oligarchic groups in government to also enter the process of making policy agendas. Even more complicated is that policy actors deliberately set agenda settings to solve their problems in the policy formulation process.

The making of policies related to the draft of the Job Creation law implied that the interests of the government are more dominant than the interests of workers and local governments (Darmawan, 2020). When this draft law was proposed to the DPR by the government, it received a lot of rejection from civil society groups in Indonesia, especially regarding the issues discussed. The quick deliberation process in the DPR to ratification aroused suspicion from many parties. The government proposed the draft law with the consideration of providing convenience in doing business for the community.

The government's aim in issuing the Omnibus Law on Job Creation is to increase economic growth by 7% from Indonesia's GDP of Rp. 1.2 trillion. Therefore, this law will simplify the bureaucratic licensing process, which has been seen as hindering investment, thereby facilitating investor entry. Through this law, economic growth is expected to increase by 6%, and job opportunities will be available to the public. The enactment of this law is a structural transformation step taken by the Jokowi Administration (Qur'ani, 2020). However, the agenda-setting and policy-formulation processes undertaken conflict with existing rules. This can be seen in the controversies that have arisen within society, especially among labour groups. A report released by the Indonesia Corruption Watch (2020) confirms the involvement of critical actors in the drafting of the Omnibus Law on Job Creation, such as the Omnibus Law Task Force in the Ministry, the Working Committee in the DPR and the DPR leadership with ties to mining and energy businesses.

Even after this law was enacted as Law Number 11 of 2020, the Constitutional Court declared it conditionally unconstitutional in Constitutional Court Decision Number 91/PUU-XVIII/2020, stating that it must be amended within two years (Mahkamah Konstitusi, 2020). The Court noted that the procedures for forming this law needed to follow clear, standard and systematic methods consistent with the legislative process. Moreover, there were changes in substance after joint approval by the DPR and the president. Indeed, these changes represent an agreed consensus involving groups within and outside the DPR and the government for their interests.

Following the law amendment as requested by the Constitutional Court, on 30 December 2022 President Jokowi issued Government Regulation instead of Law (Perppu) Number 22 of 2022 regarding Job Creation. The issuance of this Perppu aimed to ensure that the public did not discuss the amendments. Not long after, this Perppu was approved by the DPR without further discussion, becoming Law Number 6 of 2023 on 31 March 2023. The enactment of this law has had a wide-ranging impact on the regulation of investment licensing in regions, which is now taken over by the central government, especially in mining investments.

The domination of the executive in the public policy-making process can also be seen in the revision of Law Number 4 of 2009 concerning Minerals and Coal to become Law Number 3 of 2020 at the suggestion of the DPR. However, this revision changed many things in the previous Law, making this Law a new one. For example, in revising the Mineral and Coal Law, it is in the government's interest to be in line with the Job Creation Law previously drafted. According to Djafar (2020), there have been over 50% changes in the articles in the previous Mineral and Coal Law. The government proposed to amend 111 articles and add new articles to the changes. Meanwhile, the DPR proposed amending 87 articles and adding new articles to accommodate the government's wish to amend the Law. The revision of the Mineral and Coal Law by the government and the DPR has a unique agenda following the interests of these two institutions without regard to the people's aspirations.

WALHI (2021), a non-governmental organisation, accused the process of making this Law as far from public participation as is characteristic of a democratic country. This Law became the government's political agenda with the DPR without involving the people directly affected by the implementation of this Law. The community cannot submit objections to the local government because all mining matters, including Mining Business Permits (IUP) in the regions, have been withdrawn by the central government. Law Number 23 of 2014 Article 14 paragraph (1) states that 'the administration of affairs in the forestry, marine, energy and mineral resources sectors is divided between the Central Government and the Provincial Governments'. Since the agenda setting has been agreed upon between the government and the DPR, public objections to the Law will not become the concern of members of the DPR who should represent their interests.

Criticism of the Omnibus Law on Job Creation and the Mineral and Coal Mining Law has drawn attention from the public and has been reported in numerous media outlets. Interestingly, the mass media successfully framed the coverage related to these two controversial laws and shaped public opinion (see Bennett and Entman, 2001). This framing also raised public awareness, especially among civil society groups, to oppose the laws that were against their interests and beneficial to oligarchic groups and mining entrepreneurs (Indonesia Corruption Watch, 2020; Sucahyo, 2022; Susanto, 2020). Unfortunately, the civil society's opposition did not sway the government. Regardless, both laws continue to be implemented by the Jokowi administration.

The strategy of the political party coalition in forming a government led by President Jokowi was part of the DPR's domination strategy in policy making. President Jokowi was well aware of the behaviour of political party elites with solid power over their members. The pattern of undemocratic power relations within political parties in Indonesia placed the general chair of a party to intervene in the decisions of political parties. Involving the general chairpersons of political parties in the government coalition by placing them in ministerial positions in President Jokowi's cabinet made it easier for the government to formulate agenda setting. The agenda setting agreed upon in the cabinet is forwarded to the faction heads in the DPR. Meanwhile, the head of the faction will communicate it to the Kaposi to carry out the agenda setting and policy making at the commission. The character of the command system implemented in almost all political parties in Indonesia makes it easier for decision makers within political parties to follow what is ordered by the political party elite. This model of elite command of political parties impacted the minimal role of the DPR in policy making in Indonesia.

Conclusion

Indeed, there was a striking difference during the time of President Jokowi. Although the policy-making process involved a coalition strategy with political parties in the DPR, the efforts made were more systematic and massive by involving the DPR Apparatus (AKD) controlled by the coalition party. It was different from President Megawati and President Susilo that were not well structured and only reached the level of the prominent elite of political parties. The policy-making strategy under Jokowi's administration was carried out very systematically, involving intensive communication and coordination with the elite level of the political parties coalition in the AKD, such as the head of the faction group in the commission, the head of the faction on the working committee and the special committee, allowing the shared agenda to be achieved. President Jokowi's ability to formulate a strategy involving political party elites like this effectively minimises the legislature's role in policy making. Interestingly, this kind of policy-making process is still impressive as a form of democratic policy making. Hence, it is difficult for the public to

know. Even in making these policies, there are still discussions and debates in the DPR. In contrast, what happened is that the opinions and actions of DPR members towards the government in making policies are regulated and controlled by the Kapoksi by each party supporting the government.


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